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ANOTHER GASP AT PART B BLACK LUNG
BENEFITS: THE SIXTH CIRCUIT EXPANDS
AND INTERPRETS ITS PRIOR DECISIONS
Henry L. Stephens, Jr.t
INTRODUCTION
As the title to this article foretells, every black lung decision de-
cided and reported by the United States Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals between October, 1979, and October, 1980, required the
court to rule on the propriety of district court denials of black lung
benefits rendered pursuant to Part B of Subchapter IV of the Fed-
eral Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969 (1969 Act)," as
amended (Reform Act).' This fact may seem somewhat anomalous
in light of the June 30, 1973, cutoff date for filing Part B claims
with the Social Security Administration.8 Nevertheless, delayed ju-
dicial review is but one by-product of the monumental federal
black lung program which, although barely a decade old, has
awarded benefits to approximately 500,000 miners and their de-
pendents and is currently paying claims exceeding two billion dol-
lars annually.
Thus, while each of these cases involves a claim more than six
years old, the decisions themselves have a present viability. Each
decision rules upon the quantity and quality of medical evidence
needed to invoke the statutory presumptions of entitlement to
benefits found in the black lung legislation.4 In addition, these pre-
t B.A., Western Kentucky University; J.D., University of Kentucky; Assistant Professor
of Law, Chase College of Law, Northern Kentucky University.
1. Pub. L. No. 91-173, 83 Stat. 742 (1969) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. &
30 U.S.C.); see 30 U.S.C. §§ 921-31 (Supp. El 1979).
2. The original 1969 Act was substantially amended by the Black Lung Benefits Act of
1972, Pub. L. No. 92-303, 86 Stat. 150 (1972), and the Black Lung Benefits Reform Act of
1977, Pub. L. No. 95-239, 92 Stat. 95 (1976) (codified in scattered sections of 30 U.S.C.).
3. 30 U.S.C. §§ 902(c), 925(a)(1). Claims filed after June 30, 1973, must be filed with the
Secretary of Labor. See also Arnold v. Secretary of HEW, 567 F.2d 258, 258 n.1 (4th Cir.
1977) & note 5 & accompanying text infra.
4. See 30 U.S.C. §§ 921(c)(1)-(5). In view of the fact that many claims were filed by
spouses and dependents of deceased miners, testimony from the miner himself in support of
his claim is often lacking. As a consequence, these presumptions are designed to assist all
claimants in establishing entitlement to benefits under the Act. Thus, they form the back-
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sumptions are embodied in regulations presently being utilized by
the Department of Labor, Office of Workers' Compensation Pro-
grams.5 Accordingly, these cases rule not only upon the propriety
of prior adjudications but also provide direction to the Department
of Labor and the Benefits Review Board in the course of adjudicat-
ing entitlement issues presented in pending and future claims.
While the recent decisions of the Sixth Circuit do not address
the full scope of evidentiary issues which may arise in prosecuting
black lung claims, they nevertheless analyze a variety of recurring
proof problems present in establishing black lung claims. Initially,
this article will analyze Carroll v. Califano,6 which involves the use
of autopsy evidence. That analysis is followed by discussion of the
Sixth Circuit decisions involving the claims of living miners and
the use of x-ray and ventilatory study evidence. In this way, the
court's perspective on the varying effects of these types of evidence
may best be understood.
THE DECISIONS
A. Carroll v. Califano
The Sixth Circuit's decision in Carroll v. Califano represents a
strict constructionist approach to presumptions of entitlement to
benefits. It also indicates the court's disinclination to retroactively
apply portions of the 1977 Reform Act, at least in cases involving
the claims of deceased miners.
The original claimant, Millard Carroll, a coal miner for forty-
four years, retired from coal mining in 1970, four days before his
sixty-fifth birthday. On January 27, 1972, Carroll filed his applica-
tion for black lung benefits alleging a disability which he described
as "[t]ightness in lungs-difficulty breathing-short winded.""
The Social Security Administration, both on initial review and
upon reconsideration, determined that Carroll had failed to
bone of the present federal black lung benefits program. See McClaugherty & Query, Fed-
eral Black Lung Claims Administration Under the Black Lung Benefits Reform Act of
1977, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIRST ANNUAL INSTITUTE OF THE EASTERN MINERAL LAw FOUN-
DATION (Matthew Bender, 1980).
5. See, e.g., 20 C.F.R. §§ 718.302-.306 (1980). The obligation to adjudicate claims filed
after June 30, 1973, befalls the Secretary of Labor pursuant to 30 U.S.C. § 925.
6. 619 F.2d 1157 (6th Cir. 1980).
7. Id. at 1159. By filing in 1972, Carroll's claim was thus adjudicated under Part B. See
text accompanying note 3 supra.
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demonstrate the existence of pneumoconiosis (CWP) or a totally
disabling chronic lung impairment arising out of coal mine
employment.8
At the hearing, Carroll submitted both lay testimony and medi-
cal evidence to support his claim for benefits. The only lay testi-
mony in support of the claim came from Carroll, who testified that
he left his last coal mining job as a foreman since he was unable to
work because of difficulty in breathing, shortness of breath and
lack of endurance. He also stated that these conditions had pro-
gressively worsened since leaving coal mine employment and, as a
result, he had not engaged in any work since 1970. The medical
evidence supporting Carroll's claim consisted of pulmonary func-
tion studies, chest x-rays, and, since Carroll died during the pen-
dency of the proceedings, an autopsy.10
The first pulmonary function study, conducted on September 19,
1972, yielded values which were insufficient to invoke the interim
presumption of entitlement based upon medical criteria provided
by regulation.11 One of the values yielded by this study fell within
the medical criteria for entitlement employed in this regulatory
presumption while the second value exceeded such criteria. Since
both values did not fall within the stated criteria, the interim pre-
sumption could not be afforded.
12
The second pulmonary function study, conducted on December
27, 1974, yielded values which would have entitled the claimant to
the benefit of the interim regulatory presumption but for the phy-
sician's failure to include descriptive statements detailing the man-
ner in which the test was conducted. 18 Since 20 C.F.R. section
410.430 mandates such description, the Administrative Law Judge
(ALJ) did not consider this latest pulmonary function study.1"' On
8. 619 F.2d at 1159.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 1161.
11. Id. at 1159, 1160 n.4. See 20 C.F.R. § 410.490(b)(1)(ii) (1980). Section
410.490(b)(1)(ii) lists minimum values or criteria for forced expiratory volume (FEV) and
maximum voluntary ventilation (MVV) based upon the height of the miner.
12. The express language of 20 C.F.R. § 410.490(b)(1)(ii) specified that both criteria can-
not be exceeded in one test before the presumption applies. See Hill v. Heinberger, 430 F.
Supp. 332, 335 (E.D. Tenn. 1976), affd sub nom., Hill v. Califano, 592 F.2d 341 (6th Cir.
1979). See also Carroll, 619 F.2d at 1160 n.4.
13. 619 F.2d at 1161.
14. Id.
1981]
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review, the Appeals Council ruled that the failure of Carroll's phy-
sician to provide the information required by 20 C.F.R. section
410.430 precluded receiving such a test as evidence in support of
the claim. Further, the test was performed nearly eighteen months
after the Social Security Administration transferred jurisdiction of
the black lung benefits program to the Department of Labor and
was thus considered insufficient evidence of disability as of June
30, 1973.15
Subsequently, Carroll procured the information required by 20
C.F.R. section 410.430 in the form of a letter from the physician
who conducted the December, 1974, pulmonary function study,
and sought judicial review, arguing that the letter validating the
1974 pulmonary function study might have caused the Appeals
Council to invoke the interim regulatory presumption in his
favor.16 The district court overruled claimant's motion for remand
and entered summary judgment for the Social Security
Administration. 7
As a consequence, the propriety of the district court's refusal to
remand was raised in the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, which
noted that 30 U.S.C. § 923(b) allows for a remand for the taking of
additional evidence upon a showing of good cause.' 8 By this time,
however, Carroll had died and the autopsy evidence had ultimately
been interpreted as negative for CWP.' Thus, citing its earlier de-
cision in Roberts v. Weinberger,2" the Sixth Circuit ruled inter alia
that where there is no reasonable chance that the Appeals Council
would reach a different conclusion, notwithstanding newly submit-
ted evidence, good cause for a remand has not been shown.2 ' The
court ruled that even if the letter from Carroll's physician fulfilled
the requirements of 20 C.F.R. section 410.430, thus invoking the
15. Id. at 1161 n.5. See also note 5 supra. But see Begley v. Mathews, 544 F.2d 1345,
1353-54 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 985 (1977) (medical evidence accumulated
subsequent to June 30, 1973, is relevant to determine claimant's condition before July 1,
1973).
16. 619 F.2d at 1161.
17. Id. at 1161-62.
18. Id. at 1162. 30 U.S.C. § 923(b) incorporates by reference 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1976),
which "permits remanding to the Secretary for taking additional evidence upon a showing
of good cause." 619 F.2d at 1162.
19. See text accompanying.notes 42-46 infra.
20. 383 F. Supp. 230 (E.D. Tenn. 1974), affd, 487 F.2d 1403 (6th Cir. 1973).
21. 619 F.2d at 1162.
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interim presumption in his favor, the findings of the autopsy per-
formed subsequent to Carroll's death would have conclusively re-
butted this presumption of entitlement." Thus, the district court
properly declined to remand for further analysis by the Social Se-
curity Administration.
One other argument could have been raised by the claimant,
with respect to this latest pulmonary function study, even though
pulmonary function studies failed to satisfy the technical require-
ments of 20 C.F.R. section 410.430. The Benefits Review Board has
ruled that such studies may nevertheless be considered "other rele-
vant evidence" for purposes of demonstrating that the miner suf-
fers from a totally disabling chronic respiratory or pulmonary im-
pairment arising out of coal mine employment
3 or for purposes of
demonstrating totally disability once CWP has been shown.24 It is
likely, however, that the claimant would have failed in this case to
demonstrate either a totally disabling chronic respiratory or pul-
monary impairment, or even total disability, since the favorable
medical and lay testimony available to the claimant could hardly
have been deemed to be "substantial" within the meaning of Rich-
ardson v. Perales.25 Accordingly, such evidence would not have
been sufficient to support an award of benefits.
After failing to convince the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals of
entitlement by using the 1974 pulmonary function study, the
claimant ingeniously attempted to demonstrate entitlement by us-
ing the nonqualifying 1972 study and urging expansion of the
court's earlier decision in Begley v. Mathews.
26 In Begley, the court
held that for the claimant to be entitled to benefits under Part B,
the disability must be shown to have existed on or before June 30,
22. Id. at 1162-63. See text accompanying notes 42-48 infra.
23. Shresburg v. Jewell Ridge Coal Co., 9 BRBS [Benefits Review Board Service] 83,
BRB No. 77-284 BLA (Feb. 28, 1978). [The Benefits Review Board is a quasi-judicial panel
of three members. The Board has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over decisions of Adminis-
trative Law Judges arising under the Black Lung Benefits Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-227,
92 Stat. 11 (1976). For the statement of organization of the Benefits Review Board see 20
C.F.R. § 801.1 et seq. (1980).] See 20 C.F.R. § 410.414(c) (1979).
24. 20 C.F.R. § 410.426(b) (1979).
25. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971), holds that substantial evidence is "more
than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion." Id. at 401, quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB,
305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938).
26. 544 F.2d 1345.
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1973.27 Further, due to the progressive character of CWP, evidence
adduced after June 30, 1973, may be relevant in showing entitle-
ment before July 1, 1973.8
The claimant in Carroll urged that the progressive character of
the disease, when coupled with the one value reported on the Sep-
tember, 1972, test that fell within the criteria necessary for the in-
vocation of the interim presumption, made it reasonable to assume
that Carroll's condition would have deteriorated sufficiently be-
tween September, 1972, and July 1, 1973, to presume disability
before the latter date.29 In support of this contention, claimant
pointed to the December, 1974, results which would have entitled
him to the benefit of the interim presumption but for the failure of
such test to comply with the technical requirements of 20 C.F.R.
section 410.430.380
The court noted that the thrust of claimant's argument required
a judgment that even though CWP had not been documented, the
Secretary should presume that medical values revealed by a given
pulmonary function study will gradually worsen, compelling the
conclusion that the miner will be disabled by CWP at sometime in
the future. In rejecting this reasoning, the Carroll opinion quoted
with approval the Fourth Circuit court's decision in Talley v. Ma-
thews,"' wherein it stated:
Those who submitted claims prior to the onset of their disability in order
to qualify for the more lenient standards may not measure against those
standards the state of their health at some undetermined point in the
future. Such a result would cut against Congressional intent in directing
promulgation of the interim adjudicatory standards, which was to facili-
tate processing of the then existing backlog of black lung claims, within




.Thus, at least with respect to pulmonary function studies, Carroll
stands for the proposition that technical evidentiary quality stan-
dards will be strictly adhered to.
The x-ray evidence submitted in support of Carroll's claim of
27. Id. at 1352-53.
28. Id. at 1355.
29. 619 F.2d at 1163.
30. Id. at 1164. See notes 11 & 12 supra.
31. 550 F.2d 911 (4th Cir. 1977).
32. 619 F.2d at 1164, quoting 550 F.2d at 917-18.
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entitlement consisted of two x-rays taken prior to June 30, 1973.
The first was uniformly read as negative for CWP by three physi-
cians while the second chest x-ray, taken on June 25, 1973, was
read as positive for CWP by two physicians, one of whom was a
certified "A" reader of coal miners' x-rays.as This latter x-ray was
subsequently re-read as negative for CWP by two physicians who
were certified "B" readers.8 4
This was essentially the situation presented in Dickson v.
Califano,3 where the court held the claimant entitled to the bene-
fit of the interim regulatory presumption on the basis of one posi-
tive x-ray reading, notwithstanding subsequent negative readings
rendered by a certified reader chosen by the Secretary of HEW.3 6
In so ruling, the court retroactively applied one of the provisions of
the Reform Act, 30 U.S.C. section 923(b).3 7 This provision prohib-
33. 619 F.2d at 1160; Administrative Record at 27-28, Carroll v. Califano, 619 F.2d 1157
[hereinafter cited as Carroll Record].
34. 42 C.F.R. §§ 37.51-.52 (1973) set up a hierarchy of proficiency for physicians who
desire to be certified by the Social Security Administration as readers of coal miners' x-rays.
A physician desiring to be certified as a first or "A" reader must either: 1) submit six sample
x-rays, two of which he shall have diagnosed as showing no pneumoconiosis, two showing
simple pneumoconiosis and two showing complicated pneumoconiosis; or, 2) complete a
course in examining coal miners' x-rays specified by the Social Security Administration. Id.
§ 37.51(a).
To attain the status of a final or "B" reader, additional proficiency above that required
for an "A" reader must be demonstrated by taking and passing a specifically designed profi-
ciency examination. Id. § 37.51(b). When two readers are in disagreement, additional inter-
pretations are obtained from a panel of "B" readers. Id. § 37.52(a).
The practice of having "B" readers re-read the x-rays initially interpreted positive by "A"
readers was highly condemned as "administrative one-upsmanship" in a variety of forums.
See, e.g., Stewart v. Mathews, 412 F. Supp. 235, 238 (W.D. Va. 1975). This practice, how-
ever, was held not to violate due process per se in Hill v. Califano, 592 F.2d at 344-45.
Nevertheless, 30 U.S.C. § 923(b) now provides that a board-certified or board-eligible radiol-
ogist's determination that an x-ray shows CWP is binding on the Secretary in the absence of
fraud if it is taken by a radiologist or qualified technition and coupled with "other evidence
that [the] miner has a pulmonary or respiratory impairment. Id.
35. 590 F.2d 616 (6th Cir. 1978).
36. Id. at 622.
37. Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 95-239 § 5; see note 2 supra. See also Stephens, The Con-
tinuing Saga of Part B Black Lung Benefits: A Review of Recent Decisions from the Sixth
Circuit, 1980 DEr. CoLL. L. REV. 5, 18-23 & accompanying notes. Retroactive application of
various provisions of the Reform Act to pending Part B cases is suspect in light of Treadway
v. Califano, 584 F.2d 48, 51 (4th Cir. 1978), and Yakim v. Califano, 587 F.2d 149, 150 (3d
Cir. 1978). See also Moore v. Califano, 633 F.2d 727 (6th Cir. 1980), wherein the Sixth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals, in a well-documented opinion, declined retroactive application of the
re-reading prohibition of the Reform Act. Id. at 735. Nevertheless, regulations issued by the
Secretary of Labor would have allowed such application in this case. See 20 C.F.R. § 727.404
19811
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its re-reading an x-ray interpreted as positive for CWP by a board-
certified or board-eligible radiologist in any case where there is
other evidence of a pulmonary or respiratory impairment unless
the Secretary has reason to believe the claim has been fraudulently
represented." Claimant thus had one x-ray read as positive for
CWP and pulmonary function studies which, while not qualifying
for the invocation of the interim presumption, nevertheless consti-
tuted "other evidence of a pulmonary or respiratory impari-
ment."' 9 Under the rationale of Dickson, the Reform Act's prohibi-
tion on re-reading x-rays could have been retroactively applied to
Carroll's initially positive x-ray reading to afford entitlement under
the interim presumption. This is particularly true since the only
two physicians who examined Carroll found evidence of restrictive
pulmonary disease. 40 Nevertheless, the court in Carroll made no
mention of its prior holding in Dickson.
Moreover, the Reform Act also mandates acceptance of an au-
topsy report concerning the presence and state of advancement of
CWP unless the Secretary has good cause to believe that the au-
topsy report is not accurate or that the condition of the miner is
being fraudulently misrepresented. 4" Thus, Dickson's retroactive
application of the re-reading prohibition embodied in 30 U.S.C.
section 923(b) could have been applied to the autopsy evidence
submitted in Carroll.
The autopsy performed on the date Carroll died, May 9, 1975,
while concurring with the death certificate attributing death to
generalized peritonitis and gangrene of the sigmoid colon, also in-
dicated the presence of "pneumoconiosis (anthracosis)." 4 While
these findings would not have been sufficient to support a finding
of death due to CWP and afford entitlement to benefits under the
(1980).
38. 30 U.S.C. § 923(b). The Fifth Circuit has construed the re-reading prohibition em-
bodied in 30 U.S.C. § 923(b) to apply only to x-rays initially read positive for CWP by a
board-certified radiologist unless the Secretary believes the claim was fraudulently repre-
sented. Vintson v. Califano, 592 F.2d 1353, 1359 (5th Cir. 1979).
39. 30 U.S.C. § 923(b). See text accompanying notes 19-20 supra.
40. Carroll Record at 26.
41. 30 U.S.C. § 923(b). By its express terms, this prohibition against re-reading x-rays or
autopsy reports is directed to the government agencies responsible for adjudicating claims
and not responsible operators indentified pursuant to 20 C.F.R. §§ 725.490-.495 (1979). See
also 20 C.F.R. § 718.202(a)(1)(i) (1979).
42. 619 F.2d at 1161; Carroll Record at 120.
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permanent Social Security Administration regulations, 3 they seem
to establish Carroll's entitlement to benefits under the interim pre-
sumption which is afforded where "[an] autopsy establishes the ex-
istence of [CWP].""
The Appeals Council, however, submitted the autopsy slides for
further examination by a board-certified pathologist who noted
that, although the slides disclosed a certain amount of anthracotic
pigment, the amount of such pigment present was "no more than
would be expected of a city dweller."'4 5 As a consequence, he ulti-
mately concluded that the tissue samples did not represent either
complicated or uncomplicated CWP.46 Based upon this subsequent
examination of the tissue samples, the Appeals Council ruled that
the autopsy did not establish the existence of CWP.47 Accordingly,
the interim presumption could not be invoked in Carroll's favor on
the basis of the autopsy evidence. These findings were ultimately
confirmed by the district court and the Sixth Circuit, Judge Keith
noting that "[t]he pathologist's report that Carroll's pulmonary tis-
sue indicated neither simple nor complicated pneunioconiosis con-
clusively rebuts any presumption which may have arisen.
48
Thus, to the extent that Dickson ruled that a single positive x-
ray entitled the claimant to the benefit of the interim presumption,
the Sixth Circuit declined in Carroll to extend Dickson to hold
that a single autopsy showing the existence of CWP establishes en-
43. See 20 C.F.R. § 410.450 (1979).
44. 20 C.F.R. § 410.490(b)(1)(i).
45. 619 F.2d at 1161.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1164 (emphasis added). The reading of the tissue samples yielded findings
which would have precluded the interim presumption from arising. Technically, these find-
ings would not have been sufficient to rebut the interim presumption if it had been afforded
on the basis of the initial pathologist having noted the existence of bilateral CWP. With
respect to rebuttal of the interim presumption, 20 C.F.R. § 410.490(c) provides:
(c) Rebuttal of presumption. The presumption in paragraph (b) of this section
may be rebutted if:
(1) There is evidence that the individual is, in fact, doing his usual coal mine
work or comparable and gainful work (see § 410.412(a)(1)), or
(2) Other evidence, including physical performance tests (where such tests are
available and their administration is not contraindicated), establish that the indi-
vidual is able to do his usual coal mine work or comparable and gainful work (see
§ 410.412(a)(1)).
Accordingly, proof of death due to causes other than CWP is not sufficient to rebut the
interim presumption.
1981]
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titlement to benefits. In part, this may have been due to the ex-
press language of 30 U.S.C. section 923(b), which allows the Secre-
tary to reject an autopsy report if, for good cause, he believes that
it is not accurate. 49 While the initial autopsy included bilateral
CWP in the final anatomic diagnosis, the gross autopsy description
of Carroll's lungs indicated the absence of any pneumonic consoli-
dations.50 Therefore, "good cause" probably existed for rejecting
this initial autopsy in favor of the subsequent re-reading of the
tissue samples by the certified pathologist. As a consequence, Car-
roll may not have presented facts sufficient to warrant an exten-
sion of Dickson to establish entitlement based upon a single
autopsy.
Despite the Sixth Circuit's position in Carroll, the Court of Ap-
peals for the Third Circuit has given credence to the "single au-
topsy" theory. In Zielinski v. Califano,1 decided in the same year
as Dickson, the Third Circuit ordered a remand to the district
court for a reconsideration of evidence contained in the claimant's
death certificate. The death certificate identified cirrhosis of the
liver as the immediate cause of death but also listed an-
thracosilicosis as a significant condition contributing to death al-
though not related to the immediate cause of death." Noting that
this death certificate, if prepared after an autopsy, could very well
entitle the claimant to the benefit of the interim presumption,"
the court ordered a remand to allow the district court to consider
whether the evidence gleaned from the death certificate prepared,
in 1977 could have demonstrated a totally disabling pulmonary or
respiratory impairment as of June 30, 1973, due to the progressive
nature of the disease."
While an autopsy is the most credible diagnostic tool for deter-
mining the existence of CWP," few cases have ruled on entitle-
49. See text accompanying note 41 supra.
50. Carroll Record at 121.
51. 580 F.2d 103 (3d Cir. 1978).
52. Id. at 107.
53. Id. at 105.
54. See text accompanying note 40 supra.
55. 580 F.2d at 107; See also Begley v. Mathews, 544 F.2d 1345, & text accompanying
notes 22-24 supra.
56. See, e.g., King v. United Sstates Steel Corp., 8 BRBS 959, BRB No. 77-529 BLA
(June 30, 1978), wherein the Benefits Review Board upheld a hearing officer's determination
that a negative autospy report should preponderate over an x-ray showing complicated
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ment demonstrated by autopsy or biopsy evidence.57 The Sixth
Circuit court in Carroll appeared reluctant to test the uncharted
waters of autopsy reports and made no mention of the possibility
of retroactively applying 30 U.S.C. Section 923(b) to allow for ac-
ceptance of initial autopsy reports. As a consequence, Carroll's
claim for benefits was denied under a strict constructionist ap-
proach untempered by the Reform Act and its liberalizing
provisions."8
B. Miniard v. Califano
Miniard v. Califano69 squarely contradicts Carroll on retroactive
application of the Reform Act to a Part B case. Reversing the dis-
trict court, Miniard is the most liberal interpretation rendered by
the Sixth Circuit court to date regarding the quality and quantity
of medical evidence necessary to demonstrate entitlement.
Claimant Miniard filed an application for black lung benefits on
March 6, 1970. Miniard's continuing employment in the mines re-
sulted in an initial decision denying the claim. In controverting
that initial decision, Miniard requested and obtained a hearing
before an ALJ who again denied benefits.60
At the hearing, Miniard testified to previous coal mine employ-
ment of approximately twenty-eight years with his last work being
performed on June 8, 1973, just three weeks prior to the closing
date for filing Part B claims."1 In addition to recounting the usual
symptoms of CWP," Miniard stated that even though he could not
CWP, thus denying application of the 30 U.S.C. § 921(c)(3) irrebuttable presumption of
CWP. 8 BRBS at 963.
57. See, e.g., Luketich v. Director, 10 BRBS 549,BRB No. 77-304 (May 31, 1979); Drake
v. Peabody Coal Co., 10 BRBS 484, BRB No. 78-310 (April 30, 1979); Winton v. Director, 10
BRBS 147, BRB No. 78-149 (March 21, 1979). 20 C.F.R. § 718.202(a)(2) (1980) now adds
direction by providing that an autopsy report disclosing anthracotic pigment is not sufficient
by itself to establish the existence of CWP.
58. It is submitted that the court's unwillingness to apply the 30 U.S.C. § 923(b) prohibi-
tion on re-reading x-rays in Carroll when it had applied § 923(b) in Dickson, 590 F.2d 616,
and Miniard v. Califano, 618 F.2d 405 (6th Cir. 1980), see notes 55-103 & accompanying text
infra, may have been born out of suspicion that Carroll's cessation of mining employment, 4
days before his 65th birthday, was due to a desire to retire rather than a disabling condition
affected by employment.
59. 618 F.2d 405.
60. Id. at 406.
61. Id. See text accompanying note 3 supra.
62. A graphic description of the usual symptoms of the disease is found in Morris v.
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adequately perform a day's work because of the need to sit down
and rest, he continued to work to avoid economic hardship." Sig-
nificant among the reasons for the ALJ's denial of benefits was
Miniard's testimony that he ceased work when his lawyer informed
him that medical reports existed which showed CWP. As a result,
the AL held that Miniard had not demonstrated total disability
and denied benefits."
The medical evidence submitted by Miniard consisted of seven
readings of three chest x-rays and one general report by an exam-
ining physician. A chest x-ray taken on February 24, 1971, was uni-
formly read as negative for CWP. The second chest x-ray, taken on
May 19, 1972, was read as negative for CWP but was interpreted
as revealing fibroid extremes on discs of atelectasis of the left cos-
tophrenic angle."
The most disputed chest x-ray was taken on May 26, 1973, by a
board-certified radiologist who interpreted the film as positive for
CWP. A second reading by a radiologist confirmed this diagnosis.
Nevertheless, a third reading by a board-certified radiologist and
"B" reader" of x-rays was rendered at the behest of the Appeals
Council and concluded that this film was negative for CWP, al-
though it did disclose an enlarged heart abnormality.'
In addition, a general practitioner personally examined the
claimant on May 26, 1973, for complaints of shortness of breath,
coughing and chest pains on the left side. A physical examination
yielded findings including inspiratory squeaks, bronchial breathing
sounds and other concomitant abnormalities. Based on this physi-
cal examination, including the disputed chest x-ray film revealing
hilar calcifications and increased nodularity in both lung fields, the
physician diagnosed CWP, chronic bronchitis, and chronic airway
disease, as well as hypertension, arrhythmia and cardiomegaly."
In reversing the district court's denial of benefits, the Sixth Cir-
cuit court premised its finding of Miniard's entitlement to benefits
on two grounds: first, Miniard qualified for the benefit of the in-
Mathews, 557 F.2d 563, 568 (6th Cir. 1977).
63. 618 F.2d at 407.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. See note 34 supra.
67. 618 F.2d at 407.
68. Id. at 408.
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terim regulatory presumption;"' and second, the rebuttable pre-
sumption afforded him by 30 U.S.C. § 921(c)(4).7 0 This presump-
tion arises where, notwithstanding the existence of an x-ray
interpreted as negative for complicated pneumoconiosis, other evi-
dence demonstrates the existence of a totally disabling respiratory
or pulmonary impairment in a miner with at least fifteen years of
coal mine employment. Rebuttal is established by proof (a) that a
miner does not or did not have CWP, or (b) that his respiratory or
pulmonary impairment did not arise out of, or in connection with,
employment in the coal mine.
71
The court noted that the claimant qualified for the benefit of the
interim presumption on the basis of the three positive readings of
the May 26, 1973, x-ray notwithstanding the fact that this x-ray
was subsequently re-read as negative.72 In so holding, the court
precisely paralleled the analysis it had rendered in Dickson v.
Califano, which retroactively applied the Reform Act to afford en-
titlement on the basis of a single x-ray read by a board-certified
radiologist as indicative of CWP coupled with other evidence of a
pulmonary or lung disorder.78 The medical evidence submitted by
Miniard comported with these requirements: the May 26, 1973, x-
ray was initially interpreted positive by a board-certified radiolo-
gist and the general practitioner's findings of chronic bronchitis
and chronic obstructive airway disease certainly provided "other
evidence . . .of a . . .pulmonary or respiratory impairment.
74
On the basis of the subsequent negative interpretation of the
May 26, 1973, x-ray, the Appeals Counci 75 and the district court"
69. Id. at 409-10. See notes 33-44 & accompanying text supra.
70. 30 U.S.C. § 921(c)(4) provides in relevant part:
[I]f a minor was employed for fifteen years or more in one or more underground
coal mines,. . . and if other evidence demonstrates the existence of a totally disa-
bling respiratory or pulmonary impairment, then there shall be a rebuttable pre-
sumption that such minor is totally disabled due to pneumoconiosis [CWPI, or
that his death was due to pneumoconiosis, or that at the time of his death he was
totally disabled by pneumoconiosis.
Id.
71. Id.
72. 618 F.2d at 410.
73. Compare 618 F.2d at 410 with 590 F.2d at 622. See Stephens, supra note 37. But see
Moore v. Califano, 633 F.2d 727 & discussion of Moore at note 37 supra.
74. 618 F.2d at 408-09.
75. Record at 5, Miniard v. Califano, 618 F.2d 405 [hereinafter cited as Miniard Record].
76. Brief for Appellant at 27.
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ruled that plaintiff had failed to establish the existence of CWP by
x-ray evidence and thus the interim presumption could not be af-
forded. Further, both the Appeals Council and the district court 78
gave weight to Miniard's election to leave mining employment af-
ter receiving a letter from his attorney indicating that the medical
evidence supported his claim of CWP. Obviously, this fact was in-
terpreted as diminishing Miniard's claim of total disability. The
interim presumption, once afforded, can be rebutted only by dem-
onstrating that the claimant is in fact doing his usual coal mine
work or comparable and gainful work or other evidence establishes
that the individual is able to do his usual coal mine work or com-
parable gainful work.7
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the So-
cial Security Administration had failed to successfully rebut the
interim presumption.8" The court held that by his own testimony,
Miniard had established that the work he was performing as of
June 8, 1973, was not "his usual coal mine work" nor was it "com-
parable and gainful work" 81 since he was "unable to 'hord out' long
enough to 'keep up' with his co-workers and that he was unable to
perform his duties in the manner in which they should be per-
formed and as he had performed them in the past."' "8
To support its finding that Miniard's poor performance pre-
vented his latest work from being characterized as usual or compa-
rable and gainful coal mine work, the court could have relied on
prior holdings from the Third,83 Fourth," and Tenth" Circuits,
not to mention its own prior holdings in Farmer v. Mathews" and
Farmer v. Weinberger,"7 all of which validate Social Security Rul-
ing 73-36. That Ruling provides that the interim presumption is
not rebutted if the miner's employment is characterized by "spo-
77. Miniard Record at 5.
78. Brief for Appellant at 28.
79. See note 48 supra.
80. 618 F.2d at 410. See note 72 supra.
81. See note 48 supra.
82. 618 F.2d at 409.
83. Armstrong v. Califano, 599 F.2d 1282 (3d Cir. 1979).
84. Everly v. Califano, 582 F.2d 1352 (4th Cir. 1978); Collins v. Mathews, 547 F.2d 795
(4th Cir. 1976).
85. Hanna v. Califano, 579 F.2d 67 (10th Cir. 1978).
86. 584 F.2d 796 (6th Cir. 1978).
87. 519 F.2d 627 (6th Cir. 1975).
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radic work, poor performance or marginal earnings." 8 Congress, in
enacting the Black Lung Benefits Reform Act of 1977, codified this
Ruling by providing that:
...in the case of a living miner, if there are changed circumstances of
employment indicative of reduced ability to perform his or her usual coal
mine work, such miner's employment in a mine shall not be used as con-
clusive evidence that the miner is not totally disabled.8
Rather than relying on the abundance of case authority to sup-
port its conclusion that Miniard's latest employment could not be
characterized as usual, comparable or gainful, the court cited and
retroactively applied the Reform Act's codification of the Ruling!"e
The court thus buttressed the view adopted in Dickson that the
provisions of the Reform Act should be retroactively applied to
pending Part B cases.
Other Sixth Circuit decisions rendered during the same term as
Dickson indicated the court's disinclination to retroactively apply
the Reform Act. 1 On the strength of these decisions, the Social
Security Administration petitioned the court for rehearing, arguing
against retroactive application of the Reform Act." The Sixth Cir-
cuit, without published opinion, denied the petition on May 12,
1980.1" Thus Miniard affirms that the Sixth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals will view pending Part B cases of living miners in light of the
Reform Act notwithstanding contra authority, including its own
prior decisions."
88. Social Security Ruling 73-36 (1973).
89. Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 95-239, § 2(c) (codified at 30 U.S.C. § 902(f)(1)(B)(ii)
(Supp. III 1979)). As explained in the legislative history accompanying these amendments:
[A] claim for benefits under part B may not be denied solely on the basis of em-
ployment as a miner if (1) the location of such employment has recently been
changed to a mine area having a lower concentration of dust particles; (2) the
nature of such employment has been changed so as to involve less rigorous work;
or (3) the nature of such employment has been changed to employment which
receives substantially less pay.
H.R. REP. No. 864, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
275.
90. 618 F.2d at 409.
91. See Back v. Califano, 593 F.2d 758, 763 (6th Cir. 1979); Hill v. Califano, 592 F.2d
341, 346 (6th Cir. 1979), citing Treadway v. Califano, 584 F.2d 48 (4th Cir. 1978).
92. Petition for Rehearing at 4, Miniard v. Califano, 618 F.2d 405.
93. 618 F.2d 405.
94. See notes 91-92 & accompanying text supra. The application of various provisions of
the Reform Act appears in part to be at the urging of Chief Judge Edwards, by virtue of his
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The Sixth Circuit court also ruled that Miniard was entitled to
the benefit of the rebuttable presumption of total disability due to
CWP afforded by 30 U.S.C. section 921(c)(4) and the implement-
ing regulations.95 This ruling clarifies the methods of demonstrat-
ing entitlement to this presumption as expoused in Ansel v. Wein-
berger 6 and Singleton v. Califano.9
Ansel held that where this presumption has been afforded partly
on the basis of an examining physician's statement that the claim-
ant was totally disabled for coal mine employment, mere negative
x-ray interpretations or non-qualifying ventilatory studies are not
sufficient evidence to rebut it. As a consequence, once afforded on
this basis, the presumption can be rebutted only by a medical
opinion that the claimant does not have CWP. 8
Singleton provides a corollary to Ansel holding that negative x-
rays and pulmonary function studies, standing alone, do not suffice
to deny a claimant the benefit of the presumption where a treating
physician concludes that the claimant is permanently and totally
disabled from coal mine employment due to chronic lung disease."
Thus, while negative test results alone can neither rebut the pre-
sumption nor deny its operation where it has been afforded on the
basis of an opinion from an examining physician, a medical opinion
based upon negative test results could suffice to preclude the oper-
ation of, or in the alternative rebut, this presumption.100
The general practitioner who examined Miniard on May 26,
1973, diagnosed conditions indicating respiratory or pulmonary im-
pairment but did not render an opinion about the degree of claim-
ant's disability, if any, resulting from such conditions. This fact
and the subsequent negative re-reading of claimant's May 26, 1973,
x-ray, coupled with Miniard's continued employment for more
than three years after filing his claim, persuaded the ALJ and the
having authored the opinion in Dickson, 544 F.2d 1345, and his participation on the panel in
Miniard. But see Moore v. Califano, 633 F.2d 727 & the discussion of Moore at note 37
supra.
95. See 20 C.F.R. § 410.414(b) (1979) & text accompanying note 70 supra.
96. 529 F.2d 304 (6th Cir. 1976).
97. 591 F.2d 383 (6th Cir. 1979).
98. 529 F.2d at 310.
99. 591 F.2d at 385-86. Various district court opinions support this view. See, e.g.,
Superak v. Califano, 450 F. Supp. 70, 77-78 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); Matney v. Califano, 444 F.
Supp. 165, 168 (W.D. Va. 1978); Pike v. Mathews, 414 F. Supp. 848, 853 (E.D. Tenn. 1976).
100. See United States Steel Corp. v. Gray, 588 F.2d 1022, 1027 (5th Cir. 1979).
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Appeals Council that Miniard had not demonstrated the existence
of a totally disabling pulmonary or respiratory impairment and, ac-
cordingly, was not entitled to the benefit of the section 921(c)(4)
presumption. 101 The district court affirmed these findings and dis-
tinguished Ansel where the claimant had been treated and hospi-
talized for a respiratory condition and the treating physician un-
equivocally stated that Ansel was totally disabled from a chronic
respiratory or pulmonary disease.102
On appeal in the Sixth Circuit, the Social Security Administra-
tion again argued that Ansel was not controlling in the present
case in light of the absence of an opinion on disability rendered by
a treating physician. 108 Ample authority supported the contention
of the Social Security Administration that a medical opinion re-
specting the degree of claimant's disability was necessary to invoke
this presumption.'04 In spite of the absence of a medical opinion on
disability, the appellate court held Miniard entitled to the benefit
of the section 921(c)(4) presumption.105
As previously noted, the court cited 30 U.S.C. section
902(f)(1)(B)(ii), as amended by the Reform Act, for the proposition
that Miniard's continued employment did not preclude a finding of
total disability.' " Furthermore, even in the absence of a medical
opinion on disability, the court held that Miniard "presented suffi-
cient evidence of chronic respiratory or pulmonary impairment to
be considered totally disabled within the meaning of the stat-
ute. .. ., Finally, after presenting sufficient evidence, Miniard
was entitled to the presumption having demonstrated in excess of
15 years of mining employment.108
Having afforded Miniard the benefit of the presumption, the
court noted that it could only be rebutted by showing that the
miner does not have CWP or that his respiratory or pulmonary
101. Miniard Record at 5-6, 11-12.
102. Brief of Appellant at 27; See Ansel, 529 F.2d 304 at 305.
103. Brief of Defendant at 9.
104. In addition to Ansel, 529 F.2d 304, see Singleton v. Califano, 591 F.2d 383 (rebutta-
ble presumption afforded partly on the basis of an examining physician's conclusion of total
disability), and Barnette v. Califano, 585 F.2d 698, 699 (4th Cir. 1978) (absence of medical
opinion on disability noted in denying the benefit of the presumption).
105. 618 F.2d at 409. For the relevant language of § 921(c)(4) see note 70 supra.
106. See text accompanying notes 67-68 supra.
107. 618 F.2d at 409.
108. Id.
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impairment did not arise out of, or in connection with, employ-
ment in the coal mine. The only evidence tending to show that
Miniard did not suffer from CWP consisted of negative x-rays
which, standing alone, were insufficient to rebut the presumption.
In addition, since there was no evidence that Miniard's impair-
ment was a result of causes other than coal mine employment, re-
buttal on that basis was also precluded."0 9
Philosophically, the court observed that "[t]he Act is remedial in
nature and should be given a liberal construction. In the absence of
definitive medical conclusions there is a clear need to resolve
doubts in favor of the disabled miner or his survivors.""10 Accord-
ingly, the opinion of the district court was reversed and the case
remanded to the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare (now,
Health & Human Services) for an award of benefits.
In summary, Miniard greatly liberalizes the methods of demon-
strating a living miner's entitlement to benefits. A living miner
with at least fifteen years of coal mine employment can establish
entitlement to benefits under the section 921(c)(4) presumption
upon presenting a report from a treating physician indicating a re-
spiratory or pulmonary impairment even where: first, x-rays are re-
read as negative for CWP; second, the physician does not offer an
opinion respecting whether the claimant is disabled; and, third, no
ventilatory studies are presented. Moreover, benefits may be
awarded under the interim presumption by presenting a single x-
ray read as positive for CWP by a board-certified or a board-eligi-
ble radiologist if coupled with other evidence of a pulmonary or
respiratory impairment. To this extent, Miniard adds support to
the rule espoused by the court in Dickson.
C. Caraway v. Califano
The evils resulting from overreliance on negative x-ray interpre-
tations are no where better described than in Caraway v.
Califano,111 wherein the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court's
denial of benefits and remanded for an award. The case also ampli-
fied the holdings of Ansel v. Weinberger1 2 and Singleton v.
109. Id. See 20 C.F.R. § 410.414(c) (1979).
110. 618 F.2d at 410 (emphasis added).
111. 623 F.2d 7 (6th Cir. 1980).
112. 529 F.2d 304.
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Califano"s by illustrating the type of medical opinion that will be
sufficient to rebut the section 921(c)(4) presumption where it has
been afforded on the basis of findings by an examining physician.
Caraway filed his application for black lung benefits in 1970. Af-
ter his claim had been denied, both initially and upon re-examina-
tion, by the Social Security Administration, Caraway requested a
hearing before an ALJ.11' At the hearing, Caraway proved under-
ground mining employment in excess of fifteen years and testified
that as a result of breathing difficulties and general weakness, he
ceased mining employment in 1958. He further testified to the
usual symptoms of CWP including smothering spells, gasps,
wheezes, sleeping difficulties and chest pain. These symptoms were
corroborated by Caraway's wife and next-door neighbor.115
Although the bulk of x-ray evidence submitted was negative for
CWP, one physician interpreted an x-ray as positive for compli-
cated CWP while another read an additional x-ray as positive for
simple CWP.11 Further, one ventilatory study had been conducted
which, while indicative of a reduced ventilatory capacity, neverthe-
less failed to qualify Caraway under the interim regulatory pre-
sumption of entitlement.
11 7
Notwithstanding these negative test results, the overwhelming
weight of testimony furnished by treating and examining physi-
cians supported Caraway's claim of entitlement to benefits. Dr.
Porterfield, claimant's treating physician from 1965 to 1972, diag-
nosed CWP on the basis of numerous physical examinations and x-
113. 591 F.2d 383.
114. 623 F.2d at 7.
115. Id. at 9.
116. Id. at 10. Although Caraway made no claim of entitlement on the basis of the in-
terim presumption, under the court's ruling in Dickson, see text accompanying notes 35-36
supra, either of these x-ray interpretations would have entitled Caraway to benefits under
the interim presumption in light of the abundance of "other evidence of a respiratory or
pulmonary disorder." Dr. J.T. McMurray, who diagnosed complicated CWP, is a board-
certified radiologist, and Dr. J.W. Kennard, who diagnosed simple CWP, is a board-certified
radiologist and certified reader of coal miners' chest x-rays. See Administrative Record at
122, 131, Caraway v. Califano, 623 F.2d 7 [hereinafter cited as Caraway Record]. For a
definition of the various radiological certification labels see 20 C.F.R. § 718.202(a)(1)(ii)(C-
F) (1980).
117. 693 F.2d at 10. Although claimant's MVV (maximum voluntary ventilation) value
fell within qualifying range, the FEV (forced expiratory volume in one second) value ex-
ceeded the stated criteria. Both values must be within the qualifying range to establish
entitlement to benefits under the interim presumption. See notes 11-12 supra.
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rays and concluded that Caraway was unable to perform useful
work. This report was rendered in January of 1973.118 On June 5,
1973, an examining physician, Dr. Dickinson, concluded from chest
x-rays and pulmonary capacity tests that Caraway was totally dis-
ablied from multiple problems and definitely had CWP; however,
he declined to estimate the degree of total disability as a result of
CWP.119
Further, in both 1974 and 1976, examining physicians reported
that Caraway was totally disabled due to CWP. Dr. Lewis, who
issued the 1976 report, further concluded that Caraway was totally
disabled as a result of CWP on or before June 30, 1973.120 Al-
though neither the 1974 nor the 1976 examining physician's report
conclusively established Caraway's disability on or before June 30,
1973,121 the court noted that CWP is a progressive disease. There-
fore, under standards announced in Begley v. Mathews,2 2 the 1974
and 1976 reports constituted at least some evidence of Caraway's
condition as of June 30, 1973.128
The only medical report tending to discount Caraway's claim of
total disability from CWP was one rendered by a treating physi-
cian in July of 1973. While treating Caraway for chest pain, Dr.
Rolston noted that x-rays revealed a lesion in the right lower lung
and that breath sounds were very poor at the base of the right
lung. At the request of the Social Security Administration, how-
ever, Dr. Rolston submitted a report regarding claimant's respira-
tory and cardiovascular systems a month later, in which he stated
that "recent examinations have been completely unremarkable. '12' 4
On the basis of these reports, three of which concluded total dis-
ability due to CWP, it would appear axiomatic that Caraway was
entitled to the benefit of the section 921(c)(4) presumption. The
ALJ, however, clearly placed greater weight on the negative inter-
pretations of Caraway's x-rays and the non-qualifying ventilatory
study than on the reports from the examining physicians. 12 5 In
118. 693 F.2d at 9.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 10.
121. See text accompanying note 3 supra.
122. 544 F.2d 1345.
123. 623 F.2d at 11.
124. Id. at 9.
125. See, e.g., Caraway Record at 11-12.
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weighing the evidence in this manner, the ALJ relied upon Social
Security Ruling 73-37. That Ruling provides that where x-ray or
ventilatory function tests fail to meet the medical criteria required
for application of the interim presumption, there is an inference
that the miner is not totally disabled.'26 Although the Court of Ap-
peals for the Sixth Circuit has not invalidated Social Security Rul-
ing 73-37,1s7 it held in Prokes v. Mathews2 s that great care must
be exercised in its application.' 2' In Caraway, the ALJ construed
the Ruling as allowing negative x-rays and ventilatory studies to
override relevant positive evidence furnished by treating physi-
cians, thus effectively preventing the claimant from utilizing the
section 921(c)(4) rebuttable presumption.
The Appeals Council affirmed the findings of the ALJ, but per-
haps mindful of Prokes and decisions from other circuits invalidat-
ing Social Security Ruling 73-37130 specifically stated that its con-
clusion was not based upon "specific inferences of non-disability"
arising "solely from the negative x-rays and ventilatory studies of
record."' ' Notwithstanding this self-serving statement of objectiv-
ity, the Appeals Council applied the spirit if not the letter of Social
Security Ruling 73-37 by simply discrediting the physical examina-
126. Social Security Ruling 73-37 (1973). The Sixth Circuit first encountered this ruling
in Prokes v. Mathews, 559 F.2d 1057 (6th Cir. 1977), a case in which the AU had applied
the ruling, and based on a denial of the § 921(c)(4) presumption on the existence of negative
x-ray interpretations and pulmonary function studies while ignoring evidence of total disa-
bility tendered by the claimant's treating physician. 559 F.2d at 1059. To this extent, Cara-
way is duplicative of Prokes. As the court in Prokes incisively noted, to interpret the ruling
as allowing the exclusion of other relevant medical evidence whenever negative x-rays or
pulmonary function studies are present is to convert the "inference" allowed by the ruling
into a nonallowable presumption that the claimant is not disabled. Id. at 1061. Thus, Prokes
held that "[t]o the extent that (the ruling] recognizes an inference which logically flows from
consideration of proven facts, it does no violence to the Act." Id. at 1062. The use of the
ruling to limit the ability of a miner to establish entitlement to benefits by means of "other
relevant evidence," however, constitutes error and renders the § 921(c)(4) rebuttable pre-
sumption a nullity. Id. While the Third Circuit court has also criticized Social Security Rul-
ing 73-37, see Schaaf v. Mathews, 574 F.2d 157, 160 (3d Cir. 1978) and Gober v. Mathews,
574 F.2d 772, 778 (3d Cir. 1978), the Eighth Circuit court, followed recently by the Fourth
Circuit court, has invalidated the ruling in its entirety. Hubbard v. Califano, 596 F.2d 623,
626 (4th Cir. 1979); Bozwich v. Mathews, 558 F.2d at 479-80.
127. See Singleton v. Califano, 591 F.2d at 385.
128. 559 F.2d 1057 (6th Cir. 1977).
129. Id. at 1061-62.
130. See, e.g., cases cited in note 126 supra.
131. 623 F.2d at 11 n.4; Caraway Record at 176.
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tions and relying instead on the negative x-rays in the record.""2 In
Caraway, the Sixth Circuit court made no mention of Social Secur-
ity Ruling 73-37, which presumably played no part in the Appeals
Council's ruling."s
The Sixth Circuit held that the Appeals Council and the district
court, in discrediting the reports of Caraway's examining physi-
cians, violated the letter of 30 U.S.C. section 923(b) which provides
that:
In determining the validity of claims under this part [which part in-
cludes § 921(c)(4)], all relevant evidence shall be considered, including
where relevant, medical tests such as blood gas studies, x-ray examina-
tion, electrocardiogram, pulmonary function studies, or physical perform-
ance tests, and any medical history, evidence submitted by the claimant's
physician, or his wife's affidavits ... and other supportive materials."'
Here, the greater weight of the evidence furnished by Caraway's
treating physicians clearly established a totally disabling respira-
tory or pulmonary impairment, thus allowing the invocation of the
section 921(c)(4) presumption.
Where the section 921(c)(4) presumption has been afforded in
part on the basis of the medical opinion, the presumption can only
be rebutted by a medical opinion that the claimant does not have
CWP. 135 This holding of Ansel v. Weinberger was applied verbatim
in Caraway.'" The Social Security Administration's expert, Dr.
Rolston, noted that "recent examinations [of Caraway] have been
completely unremarkable.1' 37 In addition, he stated that Caraway
exhibited very poor breath sounds at the base of the right lung'"
but made no statement that Caraway did not have CWP.189 There-
fore, within the precise letter of Ansel, the Social Security Admin-
istration failed to produce a medical opinion that Caraway did not
have CWP and, accordingly, the judgment of the district court was
vacated and the case remanded for an award of benefits.
1 40
132. Id.
133. By expressly denying any application of Social Security Ruling 73-37, methinks the
Council doth protest too much!
134. 623 F.2d at 11, citing 30 U.S.C. § 923(b).
135. See text accompanying note 70 supra.
136. Compare 529 F.2d at 310 with 623 F.2d at 12.
137. 623 F.2d at 12.
138. Indeed, this is positive evidence of a pulmonary or respiratory impairment.
139. 623 F.2d at 12.
140. Id.
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Judge Kennedy, in dissent, would have held that Dr. Rolston's
report constituted substantial evidence to support the Appeals
Council and district court's finding that the claimant was not to-
tally disabled from a pulmonary or respiratory impairment in ac-
cordance with the Sixth Circuit's decision in Adkins v. Wein-
berger. 41 Adkins denied benefits to a widow attempting to
establish entitlement after her husband died while still employed
in the coal mines. The court in Adkins, however, was presented
with medical evidence that the deceased miner had been treated
for coronary insufficiency for two or three years prior to death and
his family physician attributed the cause of death to acute coro-
nary thrombosis.142 Thus, Adkins is clearly distinguishable from
Caraway wherein the claimant's medical history indicated many
years of treatment for respiratory impairments. Moreover, it seems
inconceivable that the findings of one physician could constitute
"substantial evidence"14 3  of non-entitlement to the section
921(c)(4) presumption in the face of statements from four treating
physicians, one of whom examined the claimant four times a year
over a period of seven years,1 " demonstrating entitlement to the
presumption. In accordance with the remedial nature of the federal
black lung benefits program, as documented in legislative his-
tory,145 the Sixth Circuit has long since abandoned the restrictive
view espoused by Judge Kennedy. 
14
The majority holding in Caraway strikes another blow at the ef-
fect, if not the letter, of Social Security Ruling 73-37 and but-
tresses the view taken by Ansel that rebuttal evidence must com-
ply with the precise letter of section 921(c)(4). As such, rebuttal
evidence must contain a medical opinion as to the nonexistence of
CWP where a medical opinion confirming CWP has invoked the
presumption.
141. Id. at 13 (Kennedy, J., dissenting), citing Adkins v. Weinberger, 536 F.2d 113 (6th
Cir. 1976).
142. 536 F.2d 113.
143. See note 25 supra.
144. 623 F.2d at 9.
145. See S. REP. No. 97-743, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. Nzws 2305-07, 2312-15.
146. See, e.g., Morris v. Mathews, 557 F.2d at 570, wherein the court stated "[b]oth the
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare and the United States Courts are obligated
to follow this act so as to give realistic and not niggardly effect to the stated [C]ongressional
purposes." Id.
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D. Conn v. Harris
Conn v. Harris"7 is duplicative of Caraway in that negative x-
ray readings and non-qualifying ventilatory studies received more
probative credit than statements furnished by examining
physicians.
14 8
Conn, who filed for benefits on September 1, 1970, established
by his testimony more than fifteen years of coal mine employment
as well as shortness of breath, coughing, wheezing and pain upon
bending or stooping. The only two physicians who examined the
claimant, both of whom were certified readers of coal miners x-
rays, diagnosed simple CWP on the basis of x-ray examinations.
4 '
One of these physicians, Dr. Varney, after a physical examination
and x-ray on April 9, 1973, recommended that Conn not return to
underground coal mining. 50 The only evidence militating for a
finding against the existence of a totally disabling respiratory or
pulmonary impairment consisted of negative pulmonary function
studies and negative x-ray readings rendered by non-examining
physicians.18
Consistent with the approach taken in Singleton and Ansel"
62
the court held that these negative test results, standing alone, were
not sufficient to prevent the section 921(c)(4) presumption from
arising nor could they serve to rebut it.1" As in Caraway, there
was no medical opinion in the record that the claimant did not
suffer from CWP. " Accordingly, Conn was held entitled to bene-
fits under section 921(c)(4).155
The Secretary of Health, Education & Welfare, in a supplemen-
tal brief, vigorously urged the court to remand for an opportunity
to rebut the presumption if it determined that the presumption
147. 621 F.2d 228 (6th Cir. 1980).
148. Compare 623 F.2d at 11 with 621 F.2d at 229.
149. 621 F.2d at 229. Either of these x-ray interpretations would have entitled Conn to
the interim presumption under Dickson. See note 116 supra.
150. 621 F.2d at 229.
151. Id:
152. See text accompanying notes 96-97 supra.
153. 621 F.2d at 229.
154. Id. at 230. Conn is even a stronger case than Caraway in this regard since the only
medical opinions by examining physicians in Conn were wholly supportive of his claim of
entitlement. No partially negative report such as that of Dr. Ralston in Caraway was
presented.
155. 621 F.2d at 230.
[1I:321
Part B Black Lung Benefits
should be afforded, rather than remanding for a award of bene-
fits."' The court, citing numerous authorities, declined this option
and directed an award of benefits.1 57 Indeed, a remand in order to
give the Secretary another opportunity to rebut the presumption
would have been futile where, under Ansel, as interpreted in
Miniard,15a the record was devoid of a medical opinion stating that
Conn did not have CWP.9
E. Sullivan v. Califano
Sullivan v. Califano'e0 is illustrative of the evidentiary obsta-
cles facing a miner with less than fifteen years of coal mine em-
ployment who attempts to prove total disability due to CWP. Sul-
livan is the only decision emanating from the Sixth Circuit this
term which affirms a denial of benefits as a result of the claimant's
failure to establish the existence of CWP.
Sullivan filed his claim for Part B benefits alleging total disabil-
ity due to CWP as a result of fifteen years of coal mine employ-
ment. The ALJ found Sullivan's claim of fifteen years employment
unsupported by the documentary evidence of record and deter-
mined that Sullivan had worked only ten years in the mines.116
This finding prevented Sullivan from being able to invoke the sec-
tion 921(c)(4) presumption which is premised upon fifteen years of
coal mine employment. 162
Sullivan, his wife, and son, all testified to his inability to sleep
due to breathing difficulties, constant shortness of breath, and pro-
ductive cough. Further, medical evidence in support of Sullivan's
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. See text accompanying notes 106-09 supra.
159. Curiously, the court stated "[b]ecause we order the award of benefits, we need not
decide the retroactivity of the Black Lung Benefits Reform Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-239,
which establishes a more lenient burden of proof for claimants." 621 F.2d at 230 n.2. The
court was apparently unwilling at this juncture to reconcile the inconsistent approaches it
had taken in past cases respecting retroactivity of the Reform Act. Compare Dickson, 590
F.2d 616 (applying the Reform Act retroactively) with Hill v. Califano, 592 F.2d 341 (de-
cided without reference to the Reform Act).
160. 617 F.2d 1215 (6th Cir. 1980).
161. Id. Records produced from the Social Security Administration failed to demon-
strate 60 calendar quarters of coal mine employment. Administrative Record at 73-76, Sulli-
van v. Califano, 617 F.2d 1215 [hereinafter cited as Sullivan Record].
162. See text accompanying note 70 supra.
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claim consisted of six readings of three chest x-rays, two venti-
latory studies, a physical examination, an extensive report of the
treating physician and a paper review of the two ventilatory
studies.1"
As a result of the inconclusive x-ray readings, Sullivan made no
attempt to establish entitlement to the interim presumption on the
basis of x-rays. The vetilatory studies also produced mixed results.
The first, conducted in January, 1973, failed to produce values low
enough to qualify for the interim presumption; however, a second
test, conducted in July, 1975, did yield values sufficient to qualify
for the interim presumption. The appellate court agreed with Sul-
livan's contention that this latter study, even though made approx-
imately two years after the date on which disability must be shown
(June 30, 1973), would constitute at least some evidence of Sulli-
van's condition prior to June 30, 1973.1" The results of this last
study were reviewed, at the request of the Appeals Council, by a
pulmonary specialist who determined that such studies showed
qualifying values only because Sullivan had failed to expend the
maximum breathing effort during the studies.165 As a result, the
court determined that substantial evidence supported the ALJ's
decision that the ventilatory studies were insufficient to establish
Sullivan's entitlement to benefits under the interim presumption.
Although Sullivan's coal mine employment was of insufficient
duration to afford him the benefit of the section 921(c)(4) pre-
sumption, the court noted that he could nevertheless demonstrate
entitlement if "other relevant evidence" established the existence
of a totally disabling chronic respiratory or pulmonary impairment
that arose out of coal mine employment. 66 To support his claim of
entitlement on this basis, Sullivan submitted the opinion of his
treating physician, rendered in 1971, which stated that he was dis-
abled due to several conditions, one of which was chronic obstruc-
tive lung disease. He also proffered the opinion of the physician
who had conducted the 1975 ventilatory study which stated that
Sullivan suffered from a "mild but definite obstructive pulmonary
163. 617 F.2d at 1216.
164. Id., citing Begley v. Mathews, 544 F.2d 1345.
165. 617 F.2d at 1216. It should be noted that 30 U.S.C. § 923(b), as amended by the
Reform Act, does not prohibit re-reading ventilatory studies.
166. 617 F.2d at 1216, citing 20 C.F.R. § 410.414(c) (1979).
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disease" as of June 30, 1973.16' The court presumably afforded this
opinion little weight since it was in part based on the ventilatory
study which was subsequently discredited. ' "
In addition, after a thorough physical examination which noted
clear lungs and no signs of congestion, an examining physician, Dr.
Fleming, concluded in March, 1973, that Sullivan had "no evidence
of a chronic respiratory or pulmonary disease that would prevent
coal mine work." 169 As a result, the Social Security Administration
determined that the negative ventilatory study of January, 1973,
and this March, 1973, opinion, constituted better evidence of Sulli-
van's condition as of June 30, 1973, than did the 1971 and 1975
physicians' opinions. Since the March, 1973, opinion was nearer in
time to the date upon which disability must be determined than
was the 1971 opinion, and had not been discredited as had the
1975 opinion, the 1973 opinion constituted substantial evidence
upon which to base the finding of non-entitlement to benefits. Ac-
cordingly, the judgment of the district court denying benefits was
affirmed.17 0 Thus Sullivan, when compared with the cases previ-
ously discussed herein, demonstrates that the miner with fewer
than fifteen years of coal mine employment must prove his claim
for benefits under the Act with the aid of fewer statutory and regu-
latory presumptions of entitlement than are available to miners
with lengthier coal mine employment.
CONCLUSION
The black lung decisions rendered by the United States Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals during the recent survey year see the
court clarifying the degree and type of medical evidence necessary
to invoke the section 921(c)(4) presumption. Further, the court has
more fully detailed the language that must be contained in a medi-
cal opinion that will be sufficient to rebut this presumption. While
providing meaningful explanations in this area, it is submitted that
the court's recent decisions create confusion regarding whether cer-
tain provisions of the Reform Act will be retroactively applied to
pending Part B cases. Although the court has yet to render a defin-
167. Id.
168. See text accompanying note 166 supra.
169. 617 F.2d at 1216; Sullivan Record at 6-7.
170. 617 F.2d at 1216-17.
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itive statement on the propriety of such retroactive application, it
has utilized provisions of the Reform Act in certain cases while de-
clining to do so in others which are seemingly indistinguishable on
their facts. Retroactive application of the Reform Act is highly sus-
pect in light of its legislative history, 17 1 and thus the court should
modify the holdings of Dickson and Miniard in this regard. Moore
v. Califano,1 7 presently pending before the court, affords an op-
portunity to do just that.
Throughout its decisions, one sees the court as well as federal
agencies wrestling with inconclusive x-ray readings and the eviden-
tiary effect they should be afforded. As should now be obvious, any
number of trained x-ray readers can in good faith reach different
conclusions as to whether a given x-ray discloses simple CWP.
Consequently, except in the case of complicated CWP which is
more easily diagnosed by x-ray, the existing black lung legislation
171. See, e.g., Yakim v. Califano, 587 F.2d 149, wherein the court stated:
There is evidence in the legislative history, however, supporting the premise that
Congress decided against having the Act apply to cases presently pending in the
courts. The original house bill, H.R. 4544, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 8, 16 (1977),
contained a provision mandating retroactive application of amendments affecting
certain evidentiary matters. In disapproving the Department of Health, Education
and Welfare's practice of rereading x-rays, terming it "second-guessing," the Com-
mittee report stated, "[t]he Committee therefore intends that this provision be
retroactively applied to denied and pending claims as well as to new ones ....
Because of administrative omissions in this regard, the amendment is made retro-
active to December 30, 1969 ... " Significantly, this provision was removed from
the final bill by the Senate-House Conference Committee. The Conference Com-
mittee report made no direct reference to the deletion, simply stating that "[t]he
conference substitute provides that the amendments will take effect on the date of
enactment .... ." Nevertheless, the striking of the retroactivity provision weighs
heavily against application of the evidentiary amendments to pending cases.
Id. at 150 (citations omitted). The "striking of the retroactivity provision" by the Senate-
House Conference Committee was not considered by the court in Dickson, 590 F.2d at 623.
Other courts have held that the statutory scheme or the legislative history indicate the
amendments should not be applied by the courts in cases which were decided by the Secre-
tary before the statute was passed. See Moore v. Harris, 623 F.2d 908 (4th Cir. 1980); Rob-
ertson v. Califano, 601 F.2d 1276, 1279 & 1279 n.2 (4th Cir. 1979) (denied benefits but
claimant may reapply to the agency under 1977 Reform Act); Beck v. Mathews, 601 F.2d
376, 379 n.4 (9th Cir. 1978) (refused to remand in light of the 1977 Reform Act; claimant
will have to reapply); Freeman v. Califano, 600 F.2d 1057, 1060 (5th Cir. 1979); Yakim v.
Califano, 587 F.2d at 150-51; Treadway v. Califano, 584 F.2d at 49-52; Ohler v. Secretary of
HEW, 583 F.2d 501, 506 (10th Cir. 1978) (did not apply 1977 Reform Act; claimant may
reapply under it).
172. Moore v. Califano, 633 F.2d 727, decided subsequent to the drafting of this article,
will be analyzed in detail in the 1982 DgT. CoLL. L. RiV. Survey Issue.
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should be amended to prohibit entitlement to benefits on the basis
of x-ray evidence alone.
As cases decided by the Benefits Review Board begin to be re-
viewed by the court further amplification of existing principles,
and hopefully, resolution of confusion, will occur.

